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BORDER POLICY BRIEF | SUMMER 2009 
Additional Powers of Search 
and Seizure at and Near the 
Border 
The right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly 
describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
United States Constitution 
Amendment IV 
 
That searches made at the 
border, pursuant to the 
longstanding right of the 
sovereign to protect itself 
by stopping and examining 
persons and property 
crossing into this country, 
are reasonable simply by 
virtue of the fact that they 
occur at the border, 
should, by now, require no 
extended demonstration. 
United States Supreme 
Court, 1977, U.S. v. Ramsey 
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Introduction.  In normal practice, the Fourth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution requires individualized suspicion together with 
procurement of a warrant prior to a government search and/or 
seizure.  Federal courts have recognized some exceptions,   
however, with the most common one pertaining at the nation’s  
borders, where most stops and searches are exempt from the 
usual requirements.  That exception is justified by the under-
standing that a sovereign nation has the power to control who 
and what comes within its borders.  This article describes prac-
tices related to searches and seizures at and near the border.  A 
lengthy discussion of U.S. practices is followed by a brief discus-
sion of Canadian practices. 
Defining the Border.  Border searches may occur at the land 
entry from the adjacent countries of Canada or Mexico, at the 
place a ship docks in the U.S. after having been to a foreign port, 
and at the airport where international flights first land.  Border 
searches may also be conducted at the “functional equivalent” of 
the border, which is generally the first practical detention point 
after a border crossing or point of entry.
1
  Searches at the 
“functional” border are considered no different from those con-
ducted at the physical border and are justified because of the 
infeasibility of stopping and searching a subject at the physical 
border.  Examples of functional equivalents include international 
airports within the U.S. and ports within U.S. territorial waters.    
Routine and Non-routine Searches.  In general, officials at the 
border may search any person entering or leaving the country, 
together with that person’s belongings.   
Any person or thing coming into the United States is subject to search 
by that fact alone, whether or not there be any suspicion of illegality 
directed to the particular person or thing to be searched.
2
 
[T]he examination of a person by ordinary pat-down or frisk, the re-
quirement that outer garments such as coat or jacket, hat or shoes be 
removed, that pockets, wallet or purse be emptied, are part of the rou-
tine examination of a person's effects which require no justification 
other than the person's decision to cross our national boundary.
3
 
A “routine” search of a person and his belongings may be con-
ducted without probable cause, reasonable suspicion, or a war-
rant.  Such a search must be of a nature as to pose no serious invasion of privacy.  As cited 
above, removal of outer garments and emptying of a wallet are examples of personal searches 
that are not considered unduly invasive.  A “non-routine” search involves a more serious invasion 
of privacy, and included within this category are strip searches, body-cavity searches, and x-ray 
searches.  Although such searches may still be conducted without a warrant, they must be justified 
by an appropriate degree of reasonable suspicion.  For instance, a strip search is justifiable based 
upon a “subjective suspicion supported by objective, articulable facts that would reasonably lead 
an experienced, prudent customs official to suspect that a particular person seeking to cross our 
border is concealing something on his body...”
4
  To justify a body-cavity search, however, the 
“objective, articulable facts” would need to point to concealment within the body.  It is common-
place for a routine search to uncover evidence that generates the reasonable suspicion necessary 
to justify a non-routine search. 
Federal courts have upheld the concept that the examination of inanimate objects constitutes a 
relatively minor invasion of privacy and poses little offense to the average traveler.  Virtually all ex-
aminations of inanimate objects are therefore considered to be routine (i.e., requiring neither a 
warrant nor reasonable suspicion), including practices such as:  inspection of luggage, inspection 
of outbound materials,
5
 search of a vehicle (even if the search is extensive and time-consuming), 
and x-ray examination of luggage and vehicles.
6
  Even a search that involves disassembly of a ve-
hicle (e.g., removal of the gas tank) is considered routine.
7
  Only when a search involves some de-
gree of destructiveness does there emerge a question as to whether it must be supported by rea-
sonable suspicion.  In one recent case, a court found that drilling a small hole in the bed of a 
pickup truck was not so destructive as to require reasonable suspicion, reasoning that the hole 
posed no real threat to the safety and function of the truck.
8
 
In all of the above circumstances the courts have held that the practices are consistent with the 
Fourth Amendment in that border-related searches are a reasonable necessity given the impera-
tive for a sovereign nation to protect its citizens from threats emanating from beyond the borders.  
Case law has sought to find the proper balance between this border-security imperative and the 
preservation of personal dignity and privacy. 
Electronic Storage Devices.  There is current controversy regarding the government’s right to 
search electronic storage devices (ESDs) at the border.  In an era of portable computing, it is com-
mon for individuals to store data on laptop computers, cell phones, disk drives, and other ESDs 
and travel with them across the border.  The data may be of a personal nature (such as diaries, 
medical information, financial records, and photos) or of a proprietary business nature (such as at-
torneys’ confidential client information, reporters’ undisclosed sources, or inventors’ trade secrets).  
Courts have recently been confronted with several issues: (1) whether the border search exception 
applies to ESDs; (2) if so, whether a search of ESDs is classified as routine or non-routine; (3) if 
classified as non-routine, the degree of suspicion needed to justify the search.  While the Supreme 
Court has not yet addressed this issue, lower courts have concluded that searches of ESDs fall 
under the border search exception.  However, the courts have not clearly established the degree of 
suspicion needed to conduct a search.  Early cases upholding the search of laptops at the border 
were supported by reasonable suspicion.
9
  More recently, one court held that reasonable suspicion 
was not necessary.  Stating that “searches of closed containers and their contents can be con-
ducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth Amendment,” the court did 
not recognize ESDs as distinguishable from other containers.
10
  Whether other federal courts 
adopt similar perspectives remains to be seen. 
Extended Border Searches.  The border search exception has been interpreted as allowing war-
rantless searches further inland than the physical border (or its functional equivalent).  These 
“extended border searches” are valid in the following circumstances: (1) government officials have 
reasonable certainty or a “high degree of probability” that a border was crossed; (2) they also have 
2 
3 
Figure 1.  Lands Lying within 100 Miles of the Border 
reasonable certainty that no change in the object of the search occurred between the time of the 
border crossing and the search; and (3) they have “reasonable suspicion” that criminal activity was 
occurring.
11
  In this context, “reasonable certainty” is defined as requiring more than probable 
cause, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  These three conditions establish no inher-
ent limit upon the distance from the border at which such a search might occur—suitable surveil-
lance seemingly could justify an extended border search at a location very distant from the border. 
Immigration Enforcement Nationwide.  The foregoing discussion has centered upon the interdic-
tion of illegal goods and objects.  A separate array of powers is granted to officers charged with 
enforcement of immigration laws.  Certain powers are applicable nationwide—i.e., an officer may 
enter “into any area of a business or other activity to which the general public has access or onto 
open fields that are not farms or other outdoor agricultural operations without a warrant, consent, 
or any particularized suspicion in order to question any person whom the officer believes to be an 
alien concerning his or her right to be or remain in the United States.”
12
  During initial questioning, 
this power is considered equivalent to the right of any person “to ask questions of anyone as long 
as the immigration officer does not restrain the freedom of an individual, not under arrest, to walk 
away.”
13
  If an officer develops “a reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts” that a person 
being questioned is an illegal alien, the officer may briefly detain the person for further question-
ing.
14
  An officer may arrest without warrant a person he believes to be an illegal alien.
15
 
Immigration Enforcement Near the Border.  Additional powers apply within 100 miles of the  
border.
16
  Within that zone, an officer may without warrant “board and search for aliens any vessel 
within the territorial waters of the United States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehi-
cle…”
17
  Officials may also without warrant establish stationary road checkpoints near the border.  
At such checkpoints, officers may stop vehicles for brief questioning of the driver and passengers.  
No individualized suspicion is necessary in support of the decision to stop a given car, and, in fact, 
the apparent ancestry of vehicle occupants is an allowable basis upon which to select a car.
18
  
However, an actual search of the vehicle or occupants must be supported by probable cause.
19
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In the zone within 25 miles of the border, an additional power is granted—officers patrolling the 
border may “have access to private lands, but not dwellings,” for the purpose of preventing the 
illegal entry of aliens into the U.S.
20
  During the conduct of roving patrols, a stop of a vehicle is 
authorized if the officer is “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences 
from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that a vehicle contains illegal aliens.
21
  This 
standard is less stringent than the standard of probable cause that is otherwise necessary for 
stops of vehicles by law enforcement officials within the U.S.  Interestingly, the apparent ances-
try of vehicle occupants is not (by itself) a valid basis for the stop of a vehicle by a roving officer. 
Figure 1 depicts the portion of Washington that lies within 100 miles of the Canadian border, en-
compassing the great majority of the state’s population.  Within that area, the U.S. Border Patrol 
has recently operated temporary interior checkpoints on the Olympic Peninsula and has also 
boarded state ferries for the purpose of apprehending illegal aliens.  While such activities are 
commonplace near the Mexico – U.S. border, public controversy arose in Washington. 
Some Distinctions in Canadian Practices.  In the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
section 8 establishes that “Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search and 
seizure.”  The applicability of that right at the border has been subject to judicial interpretation, 
and Canadian courts have upheld principles that are fairly consistent with American ones. 
The crux of the Crown's argument is that the reasonableness of border searches within the meaning of s. 8 
ought to be treated differently from searches occurring in other circumstances. The Crown relied heavily on 
the rationales articulated in American cases for carving out customs procedures as a general exception to 
standard search and seizure protections. The dominant theme uniting these cases is that border searches 
lacking prior authorization and based on a standard lower than probable cause are justified by the national 
interests of sovereign states in preventing the entry of undesirable persons and prohibited goods... In my 
view, the state interests enunciated throughout the American jurisprudence that are deemed to make border 
searches reasonable, are no different in principle from the state interests which are at stake in a Canadian 
customs search for illegal narcotics...
22
 
With respect to goods in the possession of a person in a customs-controlled area, an officer may 
perform a non-intrusive inspection with no individualized suspicion.  To support an intrusive in-
spection of goods, the officer must have reasonable suspicion that the goods are in contraven-
tion of law, and to support the search of a person, the officer must have reasonable suspicion 
that something in contravention of law is secreted on or about the person.
23
  Distinct from Ameri-
can practice, a person detained for personal search must be informed of their right to counsel 
(and other Charter rights), may demand to have the grounds for search reviewed by a senior offi-
cer, and can only be searched by a person of the same gender.
24
  As in America, though, all of 
the above-described searches can be conducted without a warrant, and the searches need not 
be supported by probable cause.  
4 
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